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Abstract Over the past few years a large body of literature has studied the determinants of 
individual preferences for income equality and redistributive policies. In this paper, using data 
from the World Values Survey (WVS), we specifically focus on the preferences expressed by  
Italians and analyse their determinants. We verify a number of factors, usually found to impact 
individual attitudes towards equality and redistribution, and demonstrate that self-interest 
evaluations, together with the personal system of beliefs, do influence this kind of personal 
attitudes. The results also seem to suggest that living in a specific regional context may play a 
significant role in conditioning personal attitudes.  
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1. Introduction 
What explains people’s attitude towards redistributive policies? Over the past few years a 
large number of papers have tried to answer this question with empirical analyses based on 
the micro data collected in international survey programmes, such as World Values Survey 
(WVS) and European Social Survey (ESS). The main contributions in the literature focus on 
several potential determinants: on the one hand, it seems clear that being more or less 
inclined to redistribution depends on personal economic factors (income, risk propensity, 
expectations of social mobility, etc.); on the other hand, some papers argue that  also 
personal beliefs (religiosity, work ethics, political orientation, etc.) have a strong impact on 
individual choices. Given that most of this literature is based on international comparisons, 
scholars  have also demonstrated that, in addition to individual characteristics, institutional, 
economic and cultural cross-country differences do play a significant role in influencing 
personal attitudes. The effect of context on personal attitudes may also be relevant, when 
analyzing the preferences expressed by the citizens of a single country, where a high degree 
of inter-regional dishomogeneity exists. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the WVS 
data collected in Italy; by controlling for  a number of factors usually found to impact 
individual attitudes towards equality and redistribution, we demonstrate that self-interest 
evaluations, together with the personal system of beliefs, do influence this kind of personal 
attitudes. While further refinements of the empirical analysis is still required, the preliminary 
results also seem to suggest that living in a specific regional or macro regional (north west, 
north east, centre, south) context may play a significant role in conditioning personal 
attitudes.  
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly review previous literature and its 
main results; in section 3, we present our data and the methodology applied to this study; 
section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis, while the last section is devoted to 
final comments.   
 
2. Background  
The issue of the formation of individual preferences for income equality and redistributive 
policies has been recently deeply investigated in the economic literature. Over the last ten 
years a large number of papers have been devoted to the theoretical discussion and the 
empirical testing of hypotheses about the determinants of individual support for 
redistribution.  
Most studies focus on the so-called self interest hypothesis (or homo oeconomicus effect, Corneo 
and Gruner, 2001); it assumes that individuals act as selfish utility maximizers and choose to 
support policies, only if they may obtain net economic benefits from them. Individual 
preferences for redistribution are, therefore, mainly determined by the personal economic 
condition. On the one hand, the actual income position is relevant: when it is lower than the 
mean registered in the society, people assume themselves to be beneficiaries of the 
redistribution process and so give their support to it (Meltzer and Richard, 1981); otherwise, 
they oppose it. On the other hand, even people with low present income may decide to 
support inequality, if they have strong expectations for upward mobility in the future 
(Prospect Of Upward Mobility, POUM; Benabou and Ok, 2001)1. These expectations may 
be influenced by personal and familiar history of social mobility (Piketty, 1995) or simple 
observation of the social success experienced by the others (the so-called tunnel effect, 
Hirschmann 1973).  Strong support for these hypotheses is provided  by  Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005), who analyse  the attitudes for redistribution in the American “land of 
opportunities”, and Ravallion and Lokshin (1999), who explain the high preference for 
inequality registered in Russia during the 1990s. As noted by Kaltenthaler et al. (2008), even 
education may have a positive impact on these expectations, because people with high levels 
of human capital may perceive themselves as having a high potential and so be less 
supportive of redistributive policies.  
                                                           
1 It must be noted that the existence of a link between perceived social mobility and preferences for 
inequality was highlighted by De Tocqueville (1835) when explaining the differences between 
Americans’ and Europeans’ attitudes towards redistribution.  
Finally, the self interest hypothesis includes factors, such as risk aversion and perception of 
short-term social risks (i.e. risk of income loss or reduction in income) that may have a 
positive influence on the demand for redistribution.  
The second major theoretical explanation is based on the idea that support for welfare and 
redistribution depends on non-economic ideological/behavioral motivations. According to 
this perspective, some authors (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) remark that preferences for 
redistribution may result as the consequence of a sense of altruism or as the effect of 
personal sensibility for the more general theme of equality in opportunity. Corneo and 
Gruner (2001) argue that, apart from the homo oeconomicus effect, people tend to be influenced 
by their relative position in the society (social rivalry effect) and by their individual beliefs about 
success factors (public values effect).  Fong (2001) demonstrates that personal beliefs about the 
role of effort and luck in self-determination are strong predictors of support for welfare 
policies, while economic motivations have only a secondary role.   
In general, the literature considers political values as causal predictors of individual support 
for welfare state (Kaltenthaler et al., 2008): thinking of oneself as right/left wing oriented 
may influence the personal attitude towards welfare state policies and determine low/high 
support for income equality and redistribution. However, treating subjective political 
measures as causal predictors of welfare support may cause theoretical and empirical 
problems (how can we be sure of the direction of the causal link by simply using cross-
sectional data?), even if, by using  longitudinal data and an instrumental variables approach, 
Jaeger (2006, 2008) demonstrates that the predicted causal effect actually exists.  
Adopting this kind of perspective, few authors (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Stegmuller et al., 
2011) investigate the role of religious orientation (denomination and participation) and 
conclude that religiosity negatively affects individual preferences for redistribution, probably 
because of the historical conflict between State and  Church on welfare provision.  
Other papers (Alesina et al., 2001) focus on the issue of racial orientations, arguing that the 
high preferences for inequality registered in the U.S.A. may also depend on the fact that the 
U.S. welfare spending mainly benefits discriminated minorities.  
While it is clear that country characteristics also affect individual preferences (see also the 
results of the experimental study by Farina and Grimalda, 2010), it is very difficult to 
distinguish the effects on individual attitudes determined by i) the institutional context ii) the 
national culture and iii) the economic context2. Focusing on the institutional determinants, 
Svallfors (1997) remarks that preferences for welfare policies may be influenced by the 
different welfare regimes typologies. Using German data collected after the reunification and 
adopting a more sophisticated empirical approach, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) 
analyze the impact of political regimes on individual preferences. Their results show the 
existence of significant differences between the preferences of the citizens that lived under 
the Communist regime and of those who  lived in West-Germany, with the former being 
more in favor of welfare policies and redistribution. A convergence towards the preferences  
of western people is nonetheless registered a few years after the fall of the Berlin wall.  
Luttmer and Singhal (2011) convincingly focus on the effect of “culture”, demonstrating that 
immigrants’ redistributive preferences are linked to the ones recorded in their birth countries. 
                                                           
2 In empirical analyses,  countries’ differences are usually analyzed by means of country dummy 
variables that end up being a sort of “black boxes” (Guillaud, 2008) .  
These results extend/confirmed the ones obtained by a previous work by Alesina and 
Giuliano (2010), who studied the preferences expressed by U.S. immigrants.  
While all the above mentioned papers analyze preferences for redistribution from a multi-
country perspective, less attention has been devoted to understanding how regional 
conditions may influence them. Nevertheless, especially in countries characterized by high 
inter-regional economic disparities and cultural differences, understanding the impact of 
regional conditions on personal attitudes may yield interesting results.  To the best of our 
knowledge, only a few papers  focus on differences in regional preferences for redistribution: 
one is by García-Valiñas et al. (2008), who investigate individual preferences in Spain; after 
controlling for individual characteristics, they find that regional conditions (inequality and 
regional public expenditures) may also be relevant when explaining regional differences. 
Another related paper is by Boarini and Le Clainche (2009), who analyze individual 
preferences expressed by French people and find them partially influenced by their region of 
residence. 
3. Data and methodology 
Our econometric analysis is based on the WVS aggregated database. Based on interviews to 
representative samples of the population, this database collects data about the socio-
economic characteristics of the interviewed people, together with information about their 
personal beliefs, cultural tendencies and ideas about political, religious, and economic issues. 
The WVS surveys were carried out in a wide set of countries during five rounds, from 1981 
to 2005. We base our analysis on the 2005 data that have a relatively low rate of missing 
values3. 
Assuming that people are sincere believers of their preferences, we measure the individual 
attitude towards redistribution through the answer given to the question concerning their 
preference about the desired level of income equality; in order to answer to this question, 
people had to use a scale from 1 to 10 where 1= Income should be made more equal and 10= We 
need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. For presentation purposes, we used the 
reversed scale as dependent variable (this variable is labeled REDISTRIBUTION).  
According to the literature reviewed in section 2, a broad set of variables may be selected as 
explanatory: the individuals’ socio-demographic and economic characteristics, as well as the 
institutional and spatial context they live in, may affect their support for redistributive 
policies. Unfortunately, given the limited availability of data, only some of the variables 
suggested by the literature were taken into account in this study. However, our analysis 
focuses on some of the most important ones. 
Gender, age and marital status are socio-demographic characteristics usually included as 
controls when studying this issue. Women’s attitude to solidarity (see Svallfors, 1997, for a 
discussion on this point) is reported by the literature (Edlund et al., 2005), but this thesis is 
not confirmed by all the other studies that have been carried out (Garcia-Valinas et al., 2008). 
                                                           
3 The Italian sample for 2005 was created by taking into account the regional distribution of the 
population, age and gender,  but no stratification by education was possible; therefore, people with 
lower education are under-represented. For more details see the Technical Specifications of the 2005 
Values Survey on the WVS website (http://www.wvsevsdb.com)  
In our regressions, we use the dummy variable FEMALE that takes the value 1, if the 
respondent is female. 
The impact of age is controversial, as well; from a general point of view, we can imagine that 
younger people are less supportive of state spending and redistribution as they perceive they 
have a longer time to pursue social mobility and income increments, while older people, 
especially when approaching retirement age,  may have stronger support for equality and 
income redistribution. Support for this thesis is found in some of the literature (Ravallion 
and Lokshin, 1999; Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004) and this is of particular interest here, 
because Italy is a rapidly ageing country. In our regressions, we use dummies for five age 
categories:  less than 30 years, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60 and more than 60. 
Marital status may also be relevant: divorced, separated or never married are reported to be 
more inclined to redistribution than married people (Singhal, 2008; Alesina et al, 2001: Fong, 
2001), probably because they cannot rely on the support of a partner. But also this result is 
not confirmed by other studies (Corneo and Grüner, 2002). In our regression analyses, we 
use the dummy MARRIED taking the value 1 if the respondent is married and 0 if  never 
married or divorced/separated/widowed. 
According to the homo oeconomicus approach, the respondent’s financial situation is one of the 
most important determinants of the individual support to redistribution. Most of the above 
mentioned studies agree on this point (Guillaud, 2008).  The WVS database includes one 
question about the respondent’s household income4, but unfortunately a great number of 
answers to these questions are missing. Therefore, we use the question concerning Satisfaction 
with the financial situation of the household (FINANCIAL). Answers to this question range from 1 
to 10 with 1=Completely dissatisfied and 10= Completely satisfied. Clearly, the satisfaction about 
the financial condition of the household does not depend entirely on the amount of the 
respondent’s personal income; incomes provided by other members of the household,  the 
number of members, as well as personal expectations, may influence the scores given by the 
respondents.   
Two variables are used to describe the employment status of the respondents. The dummy 
variable SELF takes the value 1, if the respondent is reported to be self employed and 0 
otherwise. This variable may be a good proxy for risk propensity  as self employed people 
may be considered as naturally risk neutral or risk loving and more inclined to accept wage 
differences as the natural consequence of differences in individual efforts. The dummy 
variable UNEMP takes the value 1 if the respondent is unemployed and 0 otherwise. 
Unemployment status may have a strong impact on redistribution: following Kaltenthaler et 
al. (2008), unemployed people think of themselves as the losers of the market’s operations 
and so may be in favor of State redistributive intervention. 
Ideological attitudes and personal beliefs may affect personal support to redistribution. Here 
we test one hypothesis using data from the WVS question about the role of personal effort 
and luck in determining personal success (HWORK). Answers are coded from 1 to 10 where 
1= in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life and 10= it’s more a matter of luck and 
connections. Thinking that personal success is just a matter of personal effort means that lack 
                                                           
4
 Respondents were asked to describe their household income choosing from a scale of incomes on 
which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the “highest income decile” in their country. 
of effort is interpreted as the cause of economic difficulties; as Boarini and Le Clainche 
(2009) show, this may lead to low support to redistribution.  
Religion may also be an important explanatory factor. Scheve and Stasavage (2006), as well as 
Stegmuller et al. (2011), argue that religion and welfare state spending may be interpreted as 
substitute mechanisms of social insurance; therefore, more religious individuals (Protestants 
and Catholics) are less supportive of social spending. We test this hypothesis by means of the 
answers to the question: Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious 
services?  (CH_ATT). Answers range from 1 to 7, where 1= more than once a week and 7= never. 
The educational level of individuals (EDUCATION) may also act as an explanatory variable: 
on the one hand, more educated people are supposed to be well informed about costs and 
benefits of the redistribution; on the other, they may have more expectations about future 
social mobility. The WVS database includes questions about the formal education level 
achieved by the respondents. We grouped answers in three categories: primary education 
(PRIMARY, no higher than the Italian “scuole medie”, middle schools with pupils aged 11-
13), secondary education (SECONDARY, no higher than “scuole superiori”, secondary 
schools with pupils aged 14-19) and tertiary education (TERTIARY, “laurea”, masters’ 
degree or higher).  
We also consider some context variables. First of all, we analyze the possible impact of the 
size of the city of residence. While some studies find residence in large cities to be correlated 
with higher preferences for redistribution and welfare policies (Alesina, 2001), it seems 
reasonable to assume that very small towns are generally characterized by a high level of 
social cohesion among the inhabitants, so that people living there are naturally more in favor 
of income equality than the ones living in very large and high income cities. Data on this 
point were taken from the WVS variable collecting respondents’ descriptions of her 
domicile. Possible answers are: more than 500.000 inhabitants (DOMSIZE4), 100.000-
500.000 inhabitants (DOMSIZE3), 20.000-100.000 inhabitants (DOMSIZE2) and less than 
20.000 inhabitants (DOMSIZE1). 
Dummies for macro regions (NORTH-WEST,NORTH-EAST, CENTRE and SOUTH, the 
latter including the islands5) and for regions (one for each of the 20 Italian regions)  are 
alternatively employed to verify the impact of other unobserved regional (areal)  
characteristics, i.e. level of economic disparity and levels of social spending.  
After the listwise deletion of incomplete cases6, the final sample contains 939 observations, 
whose distribution across regions is quite similar to the population distribution in Italy. Tab. 
1 (see appendix) summarizes these data.  
                                                           
5 According to the classification by the italian National Statistical Institute  (ISTAT), the North-West 
includes:  Valle d’Aosta , Piemont, Lombardia and Liguria; the North-East includes: Trentino Alto 
Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna; the Center includes:  Toscana, Umbria, 
Lazio, Marche and Abruzzo; the South includes: Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia 
and Sardegna. 
6 Listwise deletion is the default approach for dealing with missing data, but it may lead to biased 
estimates, especially when missing observations follow a pattern related to some unobservable variable 
(this seems not to be the case here). Anyway, only a few papers follow alternatives approaches. 
Stegmuller et al. (2011), for example, use a multiple imputation approach to generate imputed data.  
The Inspection of correlations between the explanatory variables suggests that they may be 
all simultaneously considered in the regression analyses. As expected, HWORK and 
FINANCIAL register a negative and significant correlation, but the rank correlation 
coefficient results to be low (-0.131). CH_ATT is positively correlated with HWORK and 
negatively correlated with FINANCIAL but, again, the rank correlation coefficients are very 
low (0.069 and -0.086 respectively). A low (-0.191) negative and significant correlation is also 
registered between AGE and CH_ATT. Considering EDUCATION as an ordinal variable 
(assuming three values for primary, secondary and tertiary), it results positively correlated 
with FINANCIAL with a rank coefficient equal to 0.144. DOMICILE has a significant and 
positive correlation only with EDUCATION (0.244) 
4. Results 
Given the nature of our dependent variable and according to the literature we have 
referenced, regression analyses have been carried out using an  ordered probit model7. 
Model (1) in tab. 2 (see appendix) presents the results obtained in a basic specification where 
only the socio-demographic variables (AGE, FEMALE, MARRIED) and the ones about the 
individual financial and employment condition  (FINANCIAL, SELF EMPLOYED and 
UNEMPLOYED) are used as explanatory. In models (2), (3) and (4), we added, respectively, 
the variables related to the individual educational status (EDUCATION), public values 
(HWORK and CH_ATT) and the context (DOMICILE). When including these variables, 
the results seem to be quite stable8. 
As it was expected, the coefficient of FINANCIAL is positive and significant; compatibly 
with the self interest hypothesis, individuals’ attitude towards redistribution results to be 
influenced by their financial condition: the more they feel satisfied about their financial 
condition, the less they are pro-redistribution. The coefficient of SELF INTEREST is 
negative and significant. Also this result seems to be compatible with the hypothesis that risk 
loving people are less inclined to redistributive policies.  
Given the sign of the coefficient of PRIMARY, people having lower levels of education are 
more inclined to redistribution than those having high levels of education (reference category 
                                                           
7 The main problem with the ordered probit (and the ordered logit) estimation model is that the 
parallel lines assumption is often violated, because the estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables may differ across values of the dependent variable (Williams, 2006). When the violation of 
the parallel lines assumption is confirmed by the results of the brant test, the generalized ordered 
probit approach may be applied to allow the coefficient to vary across categories of the dependent 
variable. Further research will check the robustness of the results by the adoption of the Generalized 
ordered probit model. 
8 OLS regressions were also calculated to compute variance of inflactor factor (VIF) and test for 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. OLS estimation are not reported as they are not 
significantly different from the ones obtained by ordered probit. In all  models, the variables registered 
VIF values below 4. VIF is the most popular test for collinearity, but there is no formal cutoff value to 
use with VIF for determining the presence of multicollinearity. In general, when VIF is equal to 1 
there is no collinearity, while values higher than one indicate the presence of collinearity. Values of 4 
or more (10 or more for others) are generally considered as indicators of high, and worrying, level of 
multicollinearity.  
here is TERTIARY education). No significant difference is registered between 
SECONDARY and TERTIARY. The interpretation of this result is complex: on the one 
hand, we can imagine that less educated people are not fully aware of the costs arising from 
redistribution and so tend to be more inclined to equality; on the other hand, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that they have very low chances of social mobility and so are more 
inclined to accept  State redistributive interventions.     
HWORK has positive and significant coefficient, meaning that beliefs about the roles of luck 
and effort in determining individual success affect attitudes to inequality and, consequently, 
to redistribution. As expected, thinking that personal effort is not a sufficient ingredient for 
success leads to higher preferences for income equality.  
Following the predictions, the types of DOMICILE also seem to have a significant impact 
on individual attitudes. Compared with citizens living in the few very big Italian cities, people 
living in medium size cities (100.000 – 500.000 inhabitants), in small cities (20.000-100.000 
inh.) and small towns (less than 20.000 inh.) register higher preferences for income equality. 
While the coefficient of all the other variables show signs that follow, in general, the 
predictions found in the literature (this is not true, for example, of FEMALE), they are not 
significant. This means that no significant impact on individuals’ attitude towards 
redistribution is registered for AGE, FEMALE, MARRIED and CH_ATT. 
Looking at table 3, in model (5) we added dummies for the macro regions (NORTH EAST, 
CENTRE, SOUTH with NORTH WEST as reference category). Adding these dummies 
may help to capture some of the unobserved heterogeneity; for this reason, they are routinely 
included in empirical models but may lead to unbiased estimates due to multicollinearity 
(Verme, 2011). In this case, the inclusion of dummies does not alter the estimates found in 
the previous models and multicollinearity, calculated by running OLS and VIF, seems to be 
irrelevant.   
Results obtained in model (5) indicate that the macro region of residence matters: when we 
use NORTH WEST as reference category, the sign of the coefficients of the CENTRE and 
SOUTH dummies are positive and significant, while NORTH EAST is positive but not 
significant. This may mean that areal conditions may have an influence on personal 
preferences. Following this hypothesis, in models (6) and (7) respectively, we added the 
variables GINI (the value of Gini coefficient calculated for each macro-region9) and the 
variable EXP (the average amount of social expenditures realized by the municipalities in 
each macro-region10). As it is well known, the proper econometric technique to empirically 
analyze the relationships among individuals and national level variables is hierarchical (or 
multivelel) models, but in this case we decided to use an approach based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on the macro regions, in order to set a starting point for further 
analyses.  
The results seem to confirm the hypothesis that macro-regional conditions play a relevant 
role in influencing personal attitudes; in model (7), EXP has negative but not significant 
coefficient, but in model (6) GINI has a positive and significant one, meaning that greater 
inequality leads to stronger preferences towards equality. The inclusion of clustered standard 
                                                           
9 The source here is the ISTAT regional economic accounts database. 
10 See Caltabiano (2004, in Italian)  for a discussion about the differences among the welfare models 
adopted in the Italian regions. 
errors does not affect the sign and the significance of the coefficients we obtained from the 
previous analyses, except for some of the AGE dummies.  
In model (8), we introduce regional dummies instead of macro-regional ones because the 
regional fixed effects seems more appropriate to account for differences in  omitted factors. 
An interpretation of the results is quite difficult; using Lombardy as  reference category, only 
the dummies for Friuli Venezia Giulia and Calabria are positive and significant, while the 
dummy for Molise has a negative significant sign. Even when changing the reference 
category, several differences emerge also in confronting regions from  the same area (these 
results are not reported here, but will be available on request).  
  
7. Conclusion 
Using data from the WVS collected in Italy in 2005, in this paper we apply a standard 
ordered probit model to investigate the determinants of individual attitudes towards 
redistribution. While the relevant literature has mainly studied the determinants of personal 
attitudes towards redistribution with a cross country approach so far, we focus on data from 
one single country, Italy, which is characterized by a high level of inter-regional economic 
disparity. The aim of the paper is two-fold: on the one hand, we want to test, with the 
support of the Italian data, some of the predictions found in the literature about the 
individual determinants of pro-redistribution preferences; on the other hand, we plan to 
verify if living in a specific regional context may play a significant role in conditioning 
personal attitudes.  
We found out  that self-interest evaluations (satisfaction with the financial condition of the 
household, educational status, self employment status) , together with the personal system of 
beliefs (opinion about the role of effort and luck in success), do influence personal attitudes 
towards redistribution. The results also suggest that personal attitudes may be influenced by 
the context: dimension of the city/town and income distribution in the macro region of 
residence seem to have a significant impact.   
The results achieved have some relevant limitations. First of all, as reported in section 2, the 
sample is not perfectly representative of the Italian population, given that people with lower 
education are under-represented. Therefore, the generalization of these results is very risky. 
Second, the empirical analysis may be refined with the inclusion of a generalized ordered 
logit approach to overcome the problems arising from the adoption of ordered probit 
models, in the case of violation of the parallel lines assumption. Finally, while the estimates 
we produced suggest that areal and regional economic conditions may have an impact on 
individual preferences, further research should test this hypothesis by means of multilevel 
models.    
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Appendix 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Variable Obs  Mean   Std. Dev.  Min Max 
REDISTRIBUTION 939 4.07 2.44 0 9  CENTRE 939 0.19 0.40 0 1 
AGE <30 939 0.19 0.39 0 1  SOUTH 939 0.35 0.48 0 1 
AGE 30-40 939 0.22 0.41 0 1  PIEMONTE 939 0.07 0.25 0 1 
AGE3 40-50 939 0.17 0.37 0 1  VALLE D'AOSTA 939 0.01 0.11 0 1 
AGE4 50-60 939 0.19 0.39 0 1  LOMBARDIA 939 0.15 0.36 0 1 
AGE >60 939 0.23 0.42 0 1  TRENTINO 939 0.02 0.13 0 1 
FEMALE 939 0.50 0.50 0 1  VENETO 939 0.08 0.27 0 1 
MARRIED 939 0.61 0.49 0 1  FRIULI 939 0.02 0.15 0 1 
FINANCIAL 939 6.52 1.86 1 10  LIGURIA 939 0.03 0.17 0 1 
PRIMARY 939 0.33 0.47 0 1  EMILIA 939 0.07 0.26 0 1 
SECUNDARY 939 0.44 0.50 0 1  TOSCANA 939 0.06 0.25 0 1 
TERTIARY 939 0.23 0.42 0 1  UMBRIA 939 0.02 0.13 0 1 
UNEMPL 939 0.06 0.24 0 1  MARCHE 939 0.02 0.13 0 1 
SELFEMP 939 0.17 0.38 0 1  LAZIO 939 0.10 0.29 0 1 
HWORK 939 5.28 2.54 1 10  ABRUZZO 939 0.01 0.12 0 1 
CH_ATT 939 3.57 1.71 1 7  MOLISE 939 0.01 0.12 0 1 
DOMSIZE1 939 0.52 0.50 0 1  CAMPANIA 939 0.10 0.30 0 1 
DOMSIZE2 939 0.26 0.44 0 1  PUGLIA 939 0.07 0.26 0 1 
DOMSIZE3 939 0.10 0.30 0 1  BASILICATA 939 0.01 0.09 0 1 
DOMSIZE4 939 0.12 0.33 0 1  CALABRIA 939 0.02 0.14 0 1 
NORTH-WEST 939 0.26 0.44 0 1  SICILIA 939 0.09 0.28 0 1 
NORTH EAST 939 0.19 0.40 0 1   SARDEGNA 939 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics of variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
DEP. VAR. : REDISTRIBUTION (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AGEa 30-40 -0.153 (0.110) -0.171 (0.110) -0.167 (0.110) -0.156    (0.110)    
 40-50 -0.041 (0.124) -0.086 (0.125) -0.108 (0.126) -0.101    (0.126)    
 50-60 -0.117 (0.120) -0.200 (0.123) -0.165 (0.123) -0.155    (0.123)    
 >60 -0.026 (0.113) -0.157 (0.120) -0.158 (0.120) -0.138    (0.121)    
FEMALE  -0.027 (0.068) -0.012 (0.068) -0.052 (0.070) -0.051    (0.070)    
MARRIED  -0.081 (0.078) -0.100 (0.079) -0.098 (0.080) -0.097    (0.080)    
FINANCIAL  -0.109*** (0.018) -0.101*** (0.019) -0.090*** (0.019) -0.089*** (0.019)    
UNEMPLOYED  0.187 (0.147) 0.175 (0.147) 0.166 (0.148) 0.179    (0.148)    
SELF 
EMPLOYED  -0.243*** (0.092) -0.231** (0.092) -0.215** (0.092) -0.211**  (0.092)    
EDUCATIONb SECUNDARY   0.060 (0.087) 0.043 (0.087) 0.038    (0.088)    
 PRIMARY   0.307*** (0.099) 0.279*** (0.099) 0.271*** (0.103)    
HWORK      0.073*** (0.014) 0.075*** (0.014)    
CH_ATT      -0.016 (0.021) -0.016    (0.021)    
DOMICILEc <20.000        0.180*   (0.108)    
 20.000-100.000       0.252**  (0.116)    
  100.000-500.000             0.257*   (0.142)    
  
REGIONAL 
DUMMIES 
No No No No 
 log likelihood -2011.98 -2006.07 -1991.63 -1988.97    
 LR chi square 54.71 66.53 95.41 100.73    
 Pseudo_R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02    
  Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
Tab. 2: Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** mean significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
significance level. Notes on variables: 
a
 the reference category is <30 years old. 
b 
The reference category is tertiary 
education. 
c
 The reference category is >500.000 inhabitants. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
DEP. VAR. : REDISTRIBUTION (5) (6)f (7) f (8) 
AGEa 30-40 -0.137 (0.111) -0.144*** (0.028) -0.152*** (0.032) -0.192* (0.112) 
 40-50 -0.071 (0.126) -0.087 (0.105) -0.097 (0.100) -0.097 (0.127) 
 50-60 -0.140 (0.124) -0.143* (0.077) -0.150** (0.074) -0.154 (0.124) 
 >60 -0.107 (0.122) -0.120 (0.131) -0.132 (0.133) -0.156 (0.123) 
FEMALE  -0.055 (0.070) -0.050 (0.052) -0.050 (0.051) -0.076 (0.071) 
MARRIED  -0.106 (0.080) -0.097** (0.044) -0.096** (0.044) -0.076 (0.081) 
FINANCIAL  -0.084*** (0.019) -0.085*** (0.019) -0.086*** (0.019) -0.081*** (0.019) 
EDUCATIONb SECUNDARY 0.045 (0.088) 0.043 (0.146) 0.040 (0.147) 0.035 (0.089) 
 PRIMARY 0.269*** (0.103) 0.263*** (0.083) 0.266*** (0.083) 0.284*** (0.104) 
UNEMPLOYED  0.155 (0.149) 0.153*** (0.049) 0.166*** (0.051) 0.131 (0.151) 
SELF EMPLOYED  -0.214** (0.092) -0.213*** (0.030) -0.212*** (0.029) -0.230** (0.094) 
HWORK  0.074*** (0.014) 0.076*** (0.021) 0.076*** (0.021) 0.081*** (0.014) 
CH_ATT  -0.013 (0.021) -0.012 (0.019) -0.014 (0.018) -0.020 (0.021) 
DOMICILEc <20.000 0.185* (0.111) 0.185*** (0.037) 0.189*** (0.038) 0.185 (0.123) 
 20.000-100.000 0.263** (0.119) 0.251 (0.172) 0.258 (0.179) 0.261** (0.125) 
 100.000-500.000 0.246* (0.149) 0.271* (0.144) 0.280* (0.151) 0.332** (0.166) 
AREAd NORTH-EST 0.070 (0.106)       
 CENTRE 0.192* (0.102)       
 SOUTH 0.186** (0.090)       
GINI    2.806*** (0.837)     
EXP      -0.511 (0.312)   
REGIONAL DUMMIES No No No Yes e 
log_likelihood -1986.10 -1987.70 -1988.57 -1961.45 
Wald chi squared 106.48 .  .  155.78 
Pseudo_R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Prob>chi2 0.00 .  .  0.00 
Tab. 3: Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** mean significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
significance level. Notes on variables: 
a
 the reference category is <30 years old. 
b
 The reference category is tertiary 
education. 
c 
The reference category is >500.000 inhabitants. 
d 
The reference category is North-West. 
e  
 See 
coefficients in tab 4 
f
 clustered standard errors applyed  
 
 
  
 
  coeff st. err. 
PIEMONTE -0.248    (0.159)    
VALLEAOSTA 0.186    (0.321)    
TRENTINO -0.013    (0.266)    
VENETO -0.147    (0.151)    
FRIULI 0.691*** (0.240)    
LIGURIA 0.002    (0.217)    
EMILIA -0.064    (0.158)    
TOSCANA 0.164    (0.159)    
UMBRIA 0.234    (0.283)    
MARCHE -0.097    (0.270)    
LAZIO 0.129    (0.145)    
ABRUZZO 0.218    (0.287)    
MOLISE -0.754**  (0.305)    
CAMPANIA 0.142    (0.140)    
PUGLIA -0.113    (0.155)    
BASILICATA 0.189    (0.403)    
CALABRIA 1.207*** (0.264)    
SICILIA 0.247*   (0.147)    
SARDEGNA -0.068    (0.210)    
Tab. 4: Coefficients and standard error of the regional dummies.  
The reference category is Lombardia 
 
